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NOTES
Harris v. Commonwealth:
The Use of "Statutory"
Aggravating Circumstances in
Kentucky's Sentencing Procedure
BY MELISSA BARTLETT*
I. INTRODUCTION
his Note reviews the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision m
Hams v Commonwealth' and suggests that the court and the
legislature reexamine the language of Kentucky Revised
Statutes section 532.025.2 In Hams, the court affirmed the jury's sentence
*J.D. expected 1999, University of Kentucky The author wishes to thank
Robert G. Lawson, Dorothy Salmon Professor of Law, Umversity of Kentucky, for
his help in identifying this issue as a subject for a Note.
'Harris v Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802 (Ky. 1990).
2 KY. REV STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 532.025 (Michie Supp. 1996).
This statute has been amended twice since the decision in Hams. In 1996,
language was added to section 532.025(1)(a) concerning the admissibility of
juvenile court records of adjudications of guilt in subsequent trials where the child
is tried as an adult or after the child has become an adult. See Act effective July 15,
1997, ch. 358, sec. 7, 1996 Ky. Acts. In 1998, an eighth aggravating circumstance
was added to section 532.025(2)(a), and the sentence of imprisonment for life
without benefit of probation or parole was added to the sentences in section
532.025(3) which require the finding of at least one of the statutory aggravating
circumstances enumerated in section 532.025(2). See Act approved Apr. 14, 1998,
ch. 606, sec. 72, 1998 Ky. Adv Legis. Serv. 2702, 2702-04 (Michie). These
amendments have had no effect on the issue addressed in this Note and demonstrate
the Kentucky General Assembly's failure to address it. This Note will refer to the
most recent codified version of section 532.025, the law prior to the 1998
amendments, although it was not the version in effect at the time of the Harris
decision.
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of life without possibility of parole for twenty-five years for kidnapping the
victim even though none of the aggravating circumstances listed in section
532.025(2)(a) existed.3 The literal language of the capital sentencing statute
requires thejury to find the existence of an enumerated statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance in order to apply the sentence of death or life without
possibility of parole for twenty-five years.4 In sentencing the defendant,
however, the jury found that in the course of kidnapping the victim, Harris
committed murder, which is not among those aggravating circumstances
listed.5
This Note will address the inconsistency in the court's interpretation
and application of section 532.025, as well as a possible separation of
powers violation. Furthermore, this Note will discuss the potential federal
constitutional implications of Harris in light of Gregg v. Georgia,6 the
leading case on the constitutional administration of the death sentence
which caused the Kentucky legislature to change its laws on the death
penalty.7 Finally, this Note will analyze the effect of Harris on future cases
in Kentucky.
II. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
A. The Facts
John Anthony Harris was convicted of kidnapping, wanton murder,
tampering with physical evidence, and abuse of a corpse.8 He was
subsequently "sentenced to life without possibility of parole for 25 years
for kidnapping, life imprisonment for murder, five years' imprisonment for
tampering, and 12 months imprisonment and a $500 fine for abuse of a
corpse."9 He appealed as a matter of right" to the Kentucky Supreme
Court, which affirmed his sentence."
3 See Harris, 793 S.W.2d at 805.
4See K.R.S. § 532.025(3).
5See Harris, 793 S.W.2d at 805.
6 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
7See Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283,285 (6th Cir. 1979) (concluding thatthe
death penalty may not be imposed except upon a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt of at least one statutorily prescribed aggravating circumstance).
'See Harris, 793 S.W.2d at 802.
9Id.
10 In Kentucky, the appellate process affords anyone sentenced to at least 20
years imprisonment one direct appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court as a matter
of right. See KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).
"See Harris, 793 S.W.2d at 803.
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Harris had decided to "'play a joke"' on the victim, inviting a friend,
James Timothy Elmore, to help him. 2 According to testimony at trial, the
two men planned to stop Sabra Ann Diamond's car and scare her. On the
night of April 8, 1986, the two men followed Diamond and stopped her car
on a deserted road. After Diamond would not acknowledge Harris's
presence, Harris pointed a gun at her head. When Diamond opened her
door and reached for the gun, Harris pulled the trigger. Diamond "died
from a gunshot wound to the head."' 3
Harris confessed that he and Elmore then placed Diamond into
Elmore's car and drove to LaGrange, Kentucky, where they discarded her
body in a wooded area. Elmore testified at trial that Harris sexually abused
the corpse. 4 There was also .evidence presented by the police that a small
amount of money was missing from Diamond's purse. 5
B. Harris's Argument on Appeal
The focus of this Note is Harris's argument that his aggravated
sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five
years for kidnapping was erroneous because "the jury did not find one of
the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.R.S. § 532.025(2)(a)."' 16
Harris argued that the express language in section 532.025(3) should apply
to his case and would have prevented imposition of the sentence. 7
The jury found that "in the course of the commission of the Kidnap-
ping, [Harris] murdered Sabra Ann Diamond."'" The jury subsequently
121d.
13 Id.
14 See id. at 803.
'" See id. at 802-03. Harris was additionally charged with robbery and tam-
pering with physical evidence, but the jury acquitted him of the robbery charge. See
id.
161d. at 805.
" See id. Section 532.025(3) states:
In all cases unless at least one (1) of the statutory aggravating
circumstances enumerated in subsection (2) of this section is so found, the
death penalty or the sentence to imprisonment for life without benefit of
probation or parole until the defendant has served a minimum of twenty-
five (25) years of his sentence, shall not be imposed.
K.R.S. § 532.025(3) (Michie Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
'1 Harris, 793 S.W.2d at 805.
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sentenced him to life without possibility of parole for twenty-five years. 9
However, murder is not one of the seven statutory aggravating circum-
stances listed in section 532.025(2)(a). 0 Nevertheless, the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that the "jury found a proper aggravating circumstance
to support the sentence." 2'
C. The Kentucky Supreme Court's Analysis ofKentucky Revised Statutes
Section 532. 025
The court rationalized that "the introductory language of... [section
532.025(2)] which expressly authorizes the judge and jury to consider 'any
aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law"' substantiated
Harris's sentence.' The court found that "the reference in subsection 3 to
'9 See id.
20 See K.R.S. § 532.025(2)(a).
21 Harris, 793 S.W.2d at 805.
Id. Section 532.025(2) reads:
(2) In all cases of offenses for which the death penalty may be
authorized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions
to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating
circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following
statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstances which may be supported
by the evidence:
(a) Aggravating circumstances:
1. The offense of murder or kidnapping was committed by a person
with a prior record of conviction for a capital offense, or the offense
of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of
serious assaultive criminal convictions;
2. The offense of murder or kidnapping was committed while the
offender was engaged in the commission of arson in the first degree,
robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, rape in the first
degree, or sodomy in the first degree;
3. The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping
knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one (1) person in
a public place by means of a destructive device, weapon, or other
device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than
(1) person;
4. The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or
another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of
monetary value, or for other profit;
5. The offense of murder was committed by a person who was a
prisoner and the victim was a prison employee engaged at the time of
[VOL. 87
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'statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection 2' is a
reference to all of subsection 2, not merely to that portion which lists
specific aggravating circumstances."23 The court relied upon subsection
(1)(b), which "directs the jury in all death penalty cases to determine the
existence of any aggravating circumstances 'as defined in subsection
(2).' "24 Thus, the court concluded that a reading of subsection (1)(b) "does
not limit the jury's consideration to those aggravating circumstances that
are specifically enumerated." '2
In support of its decision, the court noted that "[t]he literal language of
the last sentence in subsection 3 is in apparent conflict with the statute's
generalpurpose, as gathered from all parts of the statute. 26 Faced with this
conflict, the court concluded that "[t]he literal language must surrender.
27
m. KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES SECTION 532.025
A. History of Kentucky Revised Statutes Section 532.025
Adopted by the 1976 Extraordinary Session of the Kentucky General
Assembly,28 section 532.025 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes provides the
sentencing guidelines for Kentucky courts in capital cases.29 This statute
was enacted in response to the decision in Gregg v. Georgia31 in which the
United States Supreme Court held that mandatory death penalty statutes,
the act in the performance of his duties;
6. The offender's act or acts of killing were intentional and resulted
in multiple deaths; and
7. The offender's act of killing was intentional and victim was a
state or local public official or police officer, sheriff, or deputy sheriff
engaged at the time of the act in the lawful performance of his duties
K.R.S. § 532.025(2).
2 Harris, 793 S.W.2d at 805 (quoting K.R.S. § 532.025(3)).
' Id. (quoting K.R.S. § 532.025(l)(b)).
S Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
27Id. (citing Oates v. Simpson, 174 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Ky. 1943)).
See Smith v. Commonwealth, 599 S.W.2d 900, 909 (Ky. 1980).29 See id.
3' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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such as that contained in the Kentucky Penal Code, were unconstitutional.3
Subsequently, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted a "controlled
discretion" death penalty statute which requires the "sentencing authority
... to consider the death penalty as one of a range of sentencing options for
defendants convicted of crimes designated elsewhere in the code as
'capital' offenses." 32 During the sentencing hearing, "the sentencing
authority must take evidence concerning the presence or absence of any of
a number of mitigating and aggravating factors listed in the statute as well
as any other circumstances in mitigation or aggravation of the offense."
33
Aggravating circumstances are "those factors which would serve to
enhance punishment to a higher degree."'34
B. Kentucky Revised Statutes Section 532.025
According to the Kentucky Supreme Court in Templeman v. Common-
wealth,35 "[t]he purpose of K.R.S. 532.025 is to allow evidence of all
relevant and pertinent information so that the jury can make an informed
decision concerning the appropriate sentence in a particular case.
'36
Section 532.025 is divided into three main sections. Section 532.025(1)
requires that, upon conviction in a case where the death penalty may be
imposed, a second hearing must take place before sentencing.37 Section
532.025(1)(b) generally describes the manner in which a jury is to be
instructed, as well as the procedure for recommending and fixing the
sentence.38 Specifically, section 532.025(1)(b) states:
Upon the conclusion of the evidence and arguments, the judge shall give
the jury appropriate instructions, and the jury shall retire to determine
whether any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, as defined in
subsection (2) of this section, exist and to recommend a sentence for the
31See Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283,285 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing Gregg, 428
U.S. 153).
32 Id.
33 
1d.
34 Simmons v. Commonwealth, 746 S.W.2d 393, 399 (Ky. 1988).
35 Templeman v. Commonwealth, 785 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1990).
36 Id. at 260.
37 See K.R.S. § 532.025(1)(a) (Michie Supp. 1996).
38 See id. § 532.025(1)(b).
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defendant. Upon the findings of the jury, the judge shall fix a sentence
within the limits prescribed by law.39
Section 532.025(1) makes a reference to the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances specifically defined in section 532.025(2)." Furthermore,
section 532.025(1) provides that "the judge shall fix a sentence within the
limits prescribed by law."'
Section 532.025 (2) contains seven enumerated and specifically defined
aggravating circumstances whichthejury can consider during sentencing.
42
Section 532.025(3) discusses the procedure which the jury must follow
after finding the existence of an aggravating circumstance to recommend
a verdict of death or imprisonment for life without possibility of parole for
twenty-five years.43 Specifically, the section reads:
The jury, if its verdict be a recommendation of death, or imprisonment for
life without benefit of probation or parole, or imprisonment for life
without benefit of probation or parole until the defendant has served a
minimum of twenty-five (25) years of his sentence, shall designate in
writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance
or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In nonjury
cases, the judge shall make such designation. In all cases unless at least
one (1) of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in
subsection (2) ofthis section is so found, the death penalty or the sentence
to imprisonment for life without benefit ofprobation or parole until the
defendant has served a minimum oftwenty-five (25) years ofhis sentence,
shall not be imposed."
The last sentence of section 532.025(3) is particularly important. The issue
in Harris involved statutory interpretation.45 Despite the clear instruction
provided by the Kentucky legislature in section 532.025(3), the court opted
39Id. (emphasis added).4oSee id. § 532.025(l)-(2).
41 Id. § 532.025(l)(b).
42 See id. § 532.025(2).
" See id. § 532.025(3).
44 Id. (emphasis added).
41 See Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Ky. 1990).
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to discard this language and rely on the general introductory language of
section 532.025(2).46
C. The Application ofKentucky Revised Statutes Section 532.025 in
Other Kentucky Cases
There has been some discrepancy in applying Kentucky Revised
Statutes section 532.025(3) in light of the language of the other two
subsections. This discrepancy centers around the meaning of "statutory."
As in Harris, the question confronting the courts is whether the meaning
of "statutory" in section 532.025(3) refers to the specific, enumerated
aggravating circumstances as listed in section 532.025(2), or whether
"statutory" includes the general references throughout the statute to
"aggravating circumstances."47
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gully v. Kunzman4" considered
the history of section 532.025 in light of the constitutional limitations set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia.49 The court
concluded that the "sentencing authority may not impose the death penalty
except upon a finding, 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' of at least one of the
statutorily prescribed aggravating factors."5 However, the Gully court did
not discuss what it meant by "statutorily prescribed." Yet, in light of
Gregg, it is implicit that "statutorily prescribed" indicates those factors that
are listed by statute, such as those enumerated in section 532.025(2).5' The
language in the Gully decision is proof that Kentucky courts should be
limited in their sentencing discretion to those aggravating circumstances
specifically listed in section 532.025(2).52
When considering the application of section 532.025, Kentucky courts
often cite the rule in Zant v. Stephens.53 As the Kentucky Supreme Court
acknowledged:
46See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
47See, e.g., Harris, 793 S.W.2d at 805.
4s Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1979).
49 See id. at 285.
1 Id. at 286.
51 See K.R.S. § 532.025(2)(a) (Michie Supp. 1996).
52 See Gully, 592 F.2d at 286.
51 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (holding that the defendant's prior
criminal record was properly admitted under the Georgia statute even though one
of the statutory aggravating circumstances had been found vague under state law).
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In Zant, the United States Supreme Court states that once there is proof
of a statutory aggravating circumstance sufficient to put the defendant in
the class eligible for the death penalty, the decision as to whether the
death penalty is appropriate in the particular case then depends on the
individualized circumstances in the case.
5 4
In Zant, the defendant challenged his sentence because his prior criminal
record was admitted under a Georgia statute similar to section
532.025(1)(a) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes." The United States
Supreme Court held that one of the statutory aggravating circumstances
which the jury may have considered in the defendant's sentencing was
vague under state law. 6 It is noteworthy that the Court in Zant, although
finding one of the aggravating circumstances to be invalid, nevertheless
affirmed the judgment on the grounds that the other aggravating circum-
stances listed in the Georgia statute were sufficient to uphold the
sentence. Therefore, it can be argued that in light of the decision in Zant,
the United States Supreme Court would not find a requisite aggravating
circumstance in order to affirm Harris.
Other Kentucky cases have interpreted the application of section
532.025.11 In Gall v. Commonwealth,59 the court concluded, "If [the jury]
finds the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as specified
in KRS 532.025(2)(a), it is authorized to recommend the death penalty, but
the trial court is not bound to impose it."' The court expressly referred to
the specific aggravating circumstances listed in section 532.025.1 Implicit
in the court's rationalization is that those aggravating circumstances not
enumerated would not suffice as authority for imposing the death penalty.62
5 Bevins v. Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Ky. 1986); see Skaggs v.
Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Ky. 1985). See generally Lisa S. Paye,
Note, United States v. Cheely: Leaving the Back Door Open for Arbitrary Death
Sentencing, 40 VILL. L. REv. 1461 (1995).
55 See Skaggs, 694 S.W.2d at 678 (citing Zant, 462 U.S. at 878).
56 See Zant, 462 U.S. at 867.
57 See id. at 890.
58 See Templeman v. Commonwealth, 785 S.W.2d 259,260 (Ky. 1990) (stating
the purpose of section 532.025 is to allow the jury to hear all relevant information
so they can make an informed decision concerning an appropriate sentence).
51 Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. 1980), overruled by Payne v.
Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981).
60Id. at 104.
61 See id.
62See id.
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Furthermore, the court in Gall stated, "The trial court cannot sentence a
defendant to death unless the jury, by a unanimous verdict, has found
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or more of the aggravating
circumstances listed in KRS 532.025(2)(a)."63
Although Gall involved the appeal from a death sentence, section
532.025(3) does not differentiate between the procedure that must be
followed for a verdict of the death sentence or life without possibility of
parole for twenty-five years.' Although the reasoning of Gall should apply
to the facts in Harris, the Kentucky Supreme Court, despite the clear
language of section 532.025(3), has interpreted this statute to mean that any
aggravating circumstance, not just those listed in section 532.025(2), will
satisfy application of the death penalty or life without possibility of parole
for twenty-five years.
There are other cases in which the court has chosen to follow the
Harris line of analysis. In Stanford v. Commonwealth,66 the defendant
appealed the exclusion of evidence of a mitigating circumstance. 6 In that
death penalty case, the specific issue in Harris was not addressed, yet the
court reaffirmed its interpretation of section 532.025 by a general reference
to the statute.6 8 The court stated, "The statute says that the judge or the jury
shall consider'any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances
otherwise authorized by law' and any of the eight statutory circumstances
of mitigation.
69
In Jacobs v. Commonwealth,0 the court revisited its holding in Harris.
The court, citing Harris's interpretation of section 532.025(3) along with
section 532.025(2), reaffirmed its position regarding aggravating circum-
stances.71 The court observed, as it did in Harris, that section 532.025(3)
is "inartfully drafted."'72 Concluding that the "literal language" of section
532.025(3) must surrender to the general purpose of the statute, the court
held that "the jury's consideration of aggravating circumstances was not
63 Id. (emphasis added).
64 See K.R.S. § 532.025(3) (Michie Supp. 1996).65 See Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Ky. 1990).
66 Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1987), affd, 492 U.S. 361
(1989).
67 See id. at 788.
68 See id. at 790.
69 Id.
70 Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1994).
71 See id. at 420.
72 Id.
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limited to one exactingly and specifically enumerated in this statute."'73
Thus, the court declared the term "statutory" to be a general concept.74
The Kentucky Supreme Court in Tamme v. Commonwealth75 examined
the procedure by which a judge, in sentencing from the bench, must apply
section 532.025(3) in light of section 532.025(2). The court observed that
"[a] jury, as trier of fact, by its verdict, must find specified aggravating
circumstances in order to pass constitutional muster."76 The court then
concluded that a trial judge "may examine all the circumstances of the
case," which "may go beyond the statutory aggravators." ' Again, implicit
in the court's use of "specified" and "statutory" is the fact that correct
application of section 532.025(3) includes the finding of a specific statutory
aggravating circumstance as listed in section 532.025(2) rather than any
aggravating circumstance as reasoned in Harris.
The court has inconsistently interpreted section 532.025. Harris and its
progeny are still good law, but so is Tamme. In Jacobs, the court itself
recognized that section 532.025 is difficult to interpret and "inartfully
drafted."" The result is that judges in Kentucky are presented with
conflicting case law setting forth the limits under which they can adminis-
ter sentences.
D. Justice Leibson 's Interpretation of Kentucky Revised Statutes
Section 532.025
Justice Leibson authored a powerful dissent in Harris. He argued that
the majority upheld the sentence
on the basis that the murder of the victim in the course of the commission
of kidnapping is an aggravating circumstance "otherwise authorized by
law." The Majority so holds by quoting only aportion of the statute and
despite the fact that no statutorily enumerated circumstances were found
3 Id.
74See id.
75Tamme v. Commonwealth, 759 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1988).
761 Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
77 Id. (emphasis added).
71 Jacobs, 870 S.W.2d at 420.
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as required by KRS 532.025(2) and KRS 532.025(3).... The Majority's
interpretation is strained and fails to give effect to the statute as a whole.7 9
Justice Leibson reasoned that since section 532.025(2) uses the
conjunction "and," "the statute requires at least one of the enumerated
statutory circumstances to be found."8 He addressed the need to recognize
the clear language of the statute when applying section 532.025(3) in terms
of section 532.025(2) by concluding that "otherwise the General Assembly
would have used the disjunctive 'or' instead of the conjunctive 'and'
between the two phrases in KRS 532.025(2). ' 81 He noted that the statute
was written to comply with federal standards as set forth by Gregg and that
Gregg "mandates 'a jury's discretion must be channeled . . . [and]
circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.' ",82 Furthermore, as Justice
Leibson pointed out, the decision in Harris "eliminates the need to specify
a statutory aggravating circumstance... as required by United States
Supreme Court decisions." 3 Thus, Justice Leibson argued that the correct
interpretation of "statutory" aggravating circumstances, unlike the
majority's interpretation in Harris, includes only the aggravating circum-
stances listed in section 532.025(2).8
4
Justice Leibson's analysis is consistent with his opinions in other
Kentucky cases. Writing for the court in Matthews v. Commonwealth,5 he
reasoned that section 532.025(l)(b) "specifies that the jury . . . shall
consider statutory aggravating circumstances" and that "United States
Supreme Court requirements of specified statutory aggravating circum-
stances before imposition of the death penalty are satisfied by our death
penalty statute.., by requiring a finding of specified statutory aggravating
circumstances from the jury.816 Likewise, in his concurrence in McClellan
v. Commonwealth, 7 Justice Leibson noted that the United States Supreme
Court required "additional statutory aggravating factors before placing the
" Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802, 808 (Ky. 1990) (Leibson, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).8oId. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 809 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
8 2Id. (Leibson, J., dissenting) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
3Id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
84 See id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
85Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414 (Ky. 1985).
86 Id. at 423.
87McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1986).
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murderer in the select group that should be eligible forthe death penalty. 88
Throughout his tenure on the court, Justice Leibson consistently focused on
statutory aggravating circumstances, emphasizing the significance of the
United States Supreme Court's language.89
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS
In the recent case of Guiliani v. Guiler,9 0 Justice Cooper based his
dissent on the importance of the separation of powers doctrine in Kentucky.
He stated:
There are few constitutional principles more sacred than the doctrine of
Separation of Powers. This principle is strongly enunciated in Section 27
of our Constitution, which establishes three separate and distinct branches
of government and in Section 28, which specifically prohibits one branch
from exercising any power belonging to either of the others, except as
permitted elsewhere in the Constitution.
91
The decision in Harris raises concerns as to whether the court violated the
separation of powers doctrine in the manner in which the court interpreted
the language of Kentucky Revised Statutes section 532.025.
In Harris, the court declared that "subsection 3 of KRS 532.025 is
inartfully drafted 92 and decided to look at the general purpose of the
statute, rather than its literal language.93 Citing Oates v. Simpson,94 the
Harris court stated that "[t]he literal language must surrender."95 The court
reasoned that "the reference in subsection 3 to 'statutory aggravating
circumstances enumerated in subsection 2' is a reference to all of subsec-
tion 2, not merely to that portion which lists specific statutory aggravating
circumstances."96 According to the court, "[s]ubsection 1 (b) directs thejury
in all death penalty cases to determine the existence of any aggravating
circumstances 'as defined in subsection (2)' and hence does not limit that
88 d. at 475 (Leibson, J., concurring).
89 See id. (Leibson, J., concurring).
10 Guiliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1997).
9I Id. at 325 (Cooper, J., dissenting).
92Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Ky. 1990).
93 See id.
14 Oates v. Simpson, 174 S.W.2d 505 (Ky. 1943).
95 Harris, 793 S.W.2d at 805 (citing Oates, 174 S.W.2d at 507).96Id. (quoting K.R.S. § 532.025(3) (Michie Supp. 1996)).
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jury's consideration to those aggravating circumstances that are specifically
enumerated."97
Examination of the phrase "as defined" in terms of its literal meaning
suggests that the aggravating circumstances must be clearly defined. The
reference to other circumstances "authorized by law" in the introductory
language of section 532.025(2) is vague and does not "define" the
circumstances. Therefore, the court's reliance on the general phrase "'as
defined in subsection (2)' ,98 is misplaced.
A. Plain Meaning, Literal Language
In Simmons v. Commonwealth," the Kentucky Supreme Court stated,
"Ordinarily we construe statutes in the light of the plain meaning of the
words contained therein, and resort to legislative intent only when words
used in the statute are ambiguous."'" Similarly, the court held in Hawley
Coal Co.v. Bruce'' that "[w]here the Legislature has made no exception to
the positive terms of [a] statute, the presumption is that it intended to make
none, and it is not the province of a court to introduce an exception by
construction."' 2 The court further explained, "When language is clear and
unambiguous, it will be held to mean what it plainly expresses." 3
The language in section 532.025(3) is plain. The Harris court did not
contest this. The statute states:
In all cases unless at least one (1) of the statutory aggravating circum-
stances enumerated in subsection (2) of this section is sofound, the death
penalty or the sentence to imprisonment for life without benefit of
probation or parole until the defendant has served a minimum of twenty-
five (25) years of his sentence, shall not be imposed.1
4
The literal meaning of the italicized portion of subsection three is clear.
Section 532.025(3) unambiguously states that a prerequisite must be found
971d. (quoting K.R.S. § 532.025(1)(b)).
91 Id. (quoting K.R.S. § 532.025(1)(b)).
9 Simmons v. Commonwealth, 746 S.W.2d 393 (Ky. 1988).
'00 Id. at 398-99.
1o Hawley Coal Co. v. Bruce, 67 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1934).
102 Id. at 705.
' 3 Id. (citing Gilbert v. Greene, 216 S.W. 105 (Ky. 1919)).
'o K.R.S. § 532.025(3) (Michie Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
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before imposition of the death penalty or imprisonment for life without
parole until the defendant has served a minimum of twenty-five years.1
0 5
The prerequisite is that one of the seven statutory aggravating circum-
stances specifically listed by the General Assembly in section 532.025(2)
must be found by the jury and designated in writing. 06 In Harris, the court
rejected this literal language, despite its plain meaning.107
Of particular importance is the fact that this statute is penal in nature.
One goal of our legal system is a fair administration of justice. This
concept of justice includes proportional punishment. 8 To ensure propor-
tional punishment, the General Assembly has the responsibility of
providing unambiguous language for the courts to use as guidelines to
administer justice. Once the legislature has created the law, it is the
responsibility of the court to interpret the law and to evaluate the constitu-
tionality of the law.
The stakes are high for a defendant facing a criminal charge. Individual
liberties are at issue. The consequence of conviction can be imprisonment
or even death. Thus, is it important to ensure the fair administration of the
law. As the court inKatzman v. Commonwealth'0 9 explained long ago, "[i]t
would of course be extremely desirable if every penal statute could be
made so plain as not to leave any doubt as to its meaning, and so intelligi-
ble as that every person could by reading it at once decide what he might
with safety do under it."' '0 The Katzman court continued:
The court cannot depart from the plain meaning of the words in a penal
act, and adjudge that punishable under the statute which its language does
not fairly cover. But, in determining what may be punished under the
words of a statute, the court must apply the rule that every statute shall be
'05 See id.
"01 See id. § 532.025(2)-(3).
o"SeeHarrisv. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802,805 (Ky. 1990) (holding that
the introductory language of section 532.025(2) meant the jury could consider any
aggravating circumstances permitted by law).
'0° See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Slaughter v.
Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1987); Smith v. Commonwealth, 734
S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1987); Halvorsen v. Commonwealth, 730 S.W.2d 921 (Ky.
1987); McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1986); Bevins v.
Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d 932 (Ky. 1986); Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 709
S.W.2d 424 (Ky. 1986); Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414 (Ky. 1985).
9 Katzman v. Commonwealth, 130 S.W. 990 (Ky. 1910).
" 0 Id. at 992.
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construed literally, with a view to carry out the intention of the Legisla-
ture and promote its objects, taking all ordinary words and phrases
according to the common and approved use of language.
t
The intention of the Kentucky General Assembly with respect to the
application of section 532.025 is plain upon a literal reading of the
language of section 532.025(3). The court should recognize that plain
intent.
B. Rule for Interpreting Statutes
The Harris court relied on language from Oates v. Simpson"2 for its
decision to disregard the plain, literal language of section 532.025(3)."'
The rule of Oates is that "literal language contained in some parts of [the
statute], in apparent conflict with the general scheme should surrender to
the general purpose and intent of the legislature as gathered from all parts
of the statute."' 4 The Harris court reasoned that, despite the plain language
of section 532.025(3), the literal language should surrender to the general
purpose of the statute."5 The court stated, "The literal language of the last
sentence in subsection 3 is in apparent conflict with the statute's general
purpose, as gathered from all parts of the statute. The literal language must
surrender.""' 6 Specifically, the court noted that its interpretation of the
statute is supported by the language of section 532.025(l)(b), which
"directs the jury in all death penalty cases to determine the existence of any
aggravating circumstances 'as defined in subsection (2).' ",n7 The court
explained that the introductory language of section 532.025(2) "expressly
authorizes the judge and jury to consider 'any aggravating circum-
stances' "despite the specifically enumerated statutory aggravating circum-
stances which are listed. 18
One function of strict compliance with statutory language is the
fulfillment of the public policy considerations which underlie the creation
" Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Trent, 77 S.W. 390 (Ky. 1903)).
O2 ates v. Simpson, 174 S.W.2d 505 (Ky. 1943).
"3 See Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Ky. 1990).
4 Oates, 174 S.W.2d at 507.
" 5 See Harris, 793 S.W.2d at 805.
116Id.
"7 Id. (quoting K.R.S. § 532.025(l)(b) (Michie Supp. 1996)).
" 8 Id. (quoting K.R.S. § 532.025(2)).
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of the statute. The General Assembly is composed of elected representa-
tives of the populace. One function of the legislature is to create laws, as
needed, to reflect public policy principles of its constituents. The court in
Riley v. Kentucky Production Credit Ass n119 accurately stated, "It is true
that it is a prerogative of the General Assembly to establish public
policy."'
120
Murder is the only aggravating circumstance which the jury in Harris
found beyond a reasonable doubt to support the sentence of life without
possibility of parole for twenty-five years.12' However, murder is not one
of the seven statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in section
532.025(2).' 2 The question to be considered is whether the absence of
murder as a statutory aggravating circumstance for kidnapping correctly
reflects legislative intent. As Justice Leibson suggested in his dissent, the
legislature had the power to enumerate what other crimes or aggravating
circumstances would authorize the imposition of the death penalty or life
without parole for twenty-five years. 3 If the legislature had wanted murder
to be an aggravating circumstance for kidnapping, it should have so
provided. Justice Cooper, commenting on the separation ofpowers doctrine
in Kentucky, has stated, "[T]he fact that the legislature may make a wrong
decision is no reason why the judiciary should invade what has been
designated as the exclusive domain of another department of government
.... [T]he people have reposed that responsibility in the legislature."'124 In
summary, it was not the prerogative of the court to add an aggravating
circumstance to the statute even if the court considered the omission to be
a serious oversight.
V. HARRIS v COMMONWEALTH AND GREGG v GEORGIA
Not only did the court in Harris misinterpret Kentucky Revised
Statutes section 532.025 and arguably breach the separation of powers
doctrine, the court may have also violated federal constitutional provisions
pertaining to sentencing in capital cases as outlined in Greggv. Georgia.125
"' Riley v. Kentucky Product. Credit Ass'n, 603 S.W.2d 916 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980).
120Id. at 917.
121 See Harris, 793 S.W.2d at 802.
'2 See K.R.S. § 532.025(l)(b).
'23 See Harris, 793 S.W.2d at 802 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
24 Guiliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318, 325 (Ky. 1997) (Cooper, J., dissenting)
(citing Raney v. Stovall, 361 S.W.2d 518, 523-24 (Ky. 1962)).
'2' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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A. Gregg v. Georgia
Four years after the United States Supreme Court decided Furman v.
Georgia,'26 the Court revisited the constitutionality of the death penalty in
Gregg v. Georgia.17 In Furman, the Court held that the Georgia statute in
effect at the time gave the sentencer "unguided discretion" with respect to
the imposition of the death penalty, and that the penalty was being used
"discriminatorily, wantonly and freakishly and so infrequently that any
given death sentence was cruel and unusual."'12 8 As a result, the Georgia
legislature enacted a new statute, which narrowed the class of defendants
eligible for the death penalty by identifying the aggravating factors "which
it considers necessary and relevant to the question whether a defendant
convicted of capital murder should be sentenced to death."'2 9
In its examination of the constitutionality of Georgia's new statute, the
Gregg Court considered principles from Furman. The Court stated,
"Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on
a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be
taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as
to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."' 10
Additionally, the Court noted that "the concerns expressed in Furman that
the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner
can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing
authority is given adequate information and guidance."''
The Court in Gregg carefully examined the language and application
of the new Georgia statute.13 This statute provided enumerated statutory
aggravating circumstances, one of which must be found by the jury in the
determination to sentence the convicted to death.133 The Court found that
this new statutory scheme could be constitutionally implemented.
3
1
'26 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
127 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
28 Id. at 220-2 1.
129 Id. at 221 (White, J., concurring).
131 Id. at 189. See generally Paye, supra note 54.
131 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. See generally Geraldine A. McCafferty et al., Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 77 GEO. L.J. 1151 (1989).
132 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. See generally Linda E. Carter, A Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt Standard in Death Penalty Proceedings: A Neglected Element
OfFairness, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 195 (1991).
133 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
134 See id.
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Ultimately, the Court in Gregg concluded that the death penalty as a
form of capital punishment does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution.135 In reaching this decision, however, the
Court carefully reviewed the procedure by which the death penalty could
be utilized in the sentencing phase of a trial. 3 6 Furthermore, the Court
explored the role of the legislature in creating statutes authorizing the
application of the death penalty, as well as the responsibility of the courts
in interpreting such statutes.'37
B. Georgia's Statute Enumerating Aggravating Circumstances
Georgia's post-Furman statute specified ten statutory aggravating
circumstances, "one of which must be found by the jury to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt before a death sentence can ever be imposed."'138 Thus, the
new statute attempted to narrow the class of those eligible for the death
penalty.139 The Court noted that in addition to these ten statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances, "the jury is authorized to consider any other appropriate
aggravating... circumstances... in order to make a recommendation of
mercy that is binding on the trial court... but it mustfind a statutory
aggravating circumstance before recommending a sentence of death."
140
1
35 See id.
136 See id. See generally James R. Acker & ElizabethR. Walsh, Challenging the
Death Penalty Under State Constitutions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1299 (1989);
Annamary Sullivan, The President's Power to Promulgate Death Penalty
Standards, 125 MIL. L. REv. 143 (1989).
13 7 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174-75.
138 Id. at 196-97.
139 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,434 (1980) (Marshall, J. concurring).
Justice Marshall noted:
The Court's conclusion in Gregg was not unconditional; it was expressly
based on the assumption that the Georgia Supreme Court would adopt a
narrowing construction that would give some discernible content to §
(b)(7). In the present case, no such narrowing construction was read to the
jury or applied by the Georgia Supreme Court on appeal. As it has so many
times in the past, that court upheld the jury's finding with a simple notation
that it was supported by the evidence.
.d. at 434.
"40 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added). In Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862
(1983), the Court stated:
The [plurality's] approval of Georgia's capital punishment procedure rested
primarily on two features of the scheme: that the jury was required to find
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C. The Role of the Court and the Legislature
The Court in Gregg discussed at great length the distinct function of
the judiciary regarding interpretation of law and the responsibility and
power of the legislature to create such law.' The Court stated that "the
requirements of the Eighth Amendment must be applied with an awareness
of the limited role to be played by the courts. This does not mean that
judges have no role to play, for the Eighth Amendment is a restraint upon
the exercise of legislative power."'42 However, the Court explained,
"'Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good
flex of a democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore
most dependable, within narrow limits. Their essential quality is detach-
ment, founded on independence."'1 43
Thus, the Court emphasized the importance of adherence to the
separation of powers doctrine when interpreting penal statutes such as the
Georgia statute.'" The Court recognized that there is a presumption that
laws created and enacted by the legislature are valid.45 "Therefore, in
assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature
against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity .... And a
heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the
representative of the people."'" Moreover, the Court stated, "[W]hile we
have an obligation to insure that constitutional bounds are not overreached,
we may not act as judges as we might as legislators."'47 The Court implied
that once the legislature has spoken as to the punishment for a crime, the
punishment should stand unless application of that punishment would
at least one valid statutory aggravating circumstance and to identify it in
writing, and that that the State Supreme Court reviewed the record of every
penalty proceeding to determine whether the sentence was arbitrary or
disproportionate. These elements, the opinion concluded, adequately
protected against the wanton and freakish imposition of the death penalty.
This conclusion rested, of course, on the fundamental requirement that each
statutory aggravating circumstance must satisfy a constitutional standard
derived from the principles of Furman itself.
Id. at 876.
141 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174-75.
142 Id. at 174.
14 Id. at 175 (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951)).
'44 See id.
145 See id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 174-75.
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involve a violation of the Constitution. For example, a court may often
examine a particular statute to determine if it is overly broad, vague, or
discriminatory.
D. The Effect ofHarris in Light of Gregg
Although the defendant in Harris was not sentenced to death,'48 the
principles regarding statutory interpretation set forth in Gregg apply. The
issue inHarris centers on whether, according to Kentucky Revised Statutes
section 532.025(3), the jury can sentence a defendant to death or life
without possibility of parole for twenty-five years only if the jury finds at
least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances to exist.'49
Section 532.025 is strikingly similar to the statute in question in Gregg.
The Georgia statute lists ten statutory aggravating circumstances. 0 Section
532.025(2)(a) lists seven.'51 Nevertheless, the circumstances listed are
similar. Especially significant is the similar language referencing "statutory
aggravating circumstances."' 52 Section 532.025 was modeled after the
Georgia statute, which was declared constitutional by the United States
Supreme Court in Gregg.'53 This signals that the Kentucky legislature took
note of Gregg and passed the statute as a safeguard to insure that any
subsequent review ofKentucky's death sentencing procedure would at least
pass constitutional muster.
While similarities in the two statutes are important, it is even
more important to consider the holding in Harris in light of the principles
of statutory interpretation that Gregg announced.' In Godfrey v.
"' See Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802, 802 (Ky. 1990).
149 See K.R.S. § 532.025 (Michie Supp. 1996).
'
50 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9 (quoting GA. CODEANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp.
1975) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1997)).
"' See K.R.S. § 532.025(2)(a).
,52 Id. § 532.025(2); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-
2534.1(b)).
' See Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671, 679 (Ky. 1984).
'54 The new Georgia sentencing procedures, by contrast, focus the jury's
attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized
characteristics of the individual defendant. While the jury is permitted to
consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must find and
identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a
penalty of death. In this way the jury's discretion is channeled.... it [jury]
is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07; see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983)
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Georgia,'55 Justice Marshall emphasized the importance of the Gregg
principles in his concurrence by stating that "[n]early every week of every
year, this Court is presented with at least one petition for certiorari raising
troubling issues of noncompliance with the strictures of Gregg and its
progeny. ' 156 Justice Marshall continued, "The Court's cases make clear that
it is the sentencer's discretion that must be channeled and guided by clear,
objective, and specific standards."'
15 7
The Kentucky General Assembly enacted section 532.025 to provide
specific standards to guide a jury when deliberating whether to impose a
capital sentence. 5 These standards are listed in section 532.025(2) and
required by section 532.025(3).'15 Thus, the aggravating circumstances
listed in section 532.025(2) serve as the necessary specific standards for
Kentucky's capital sentencing procedure. 6 Such standards are important
for the juries to assess the appropriate sentence. As the Court in Gregg
stated:
The idea that ajury should be given guidance in its decisionmaking is also
hardly a novel proposition. Juries are invariably given careful instructions
on the law and how to apply it before they are authorized to decide the
merits of a lawsuit. It would be virtually unthinkable to follow any other
("Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference to the broad
authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits
of punishments for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in
sentencing convicted criminals.").
' Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
116 Id. at 438 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall stated:
On numerous occasions since Gregg, the Court has reversed decisions of
State Supreme Courts upholding the imposition of capital punishment,
frequently on the ground that the sentencing proceeding allowed undue
discretion, causing dangers of arbitrariness in violation of Gregg and its
companion cases. These developments, coupled with other persuasive
evidence, strongly suggest that appellate courts are incapable of
guaranteeing the kind of objectivity and evenhandedness that the Court
contemplated and hoped for in Gregg.
Id. at 438-39 (Marshall, J., concurring).
157 Id. at 437 (Marshall, J., concurring).
' See GOVERNOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TEAM, FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 76 (1997) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS].
159 See K.R.S. § 532.025(2)-(3) (Michie Supp. 1996).
160 See id. § 532.025(2).
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course in a legal system that has traditionally operated by following prior
precedents and fixed rules of law.... While some have suggested that
standards to guide a capital jury's sentencing deliberations are impossible
to formulate, the fact is that such standards have been developed .
61
Kentucky Revised Statutes section 532.025(3) provides a specific
limitation on the jury that if it cannot find the existence of at least one of
the circumstances listed in section 532.025(2) beyond a reasonable doubt,
then the death penalty or life without possibility of parole for twenty-five
years is not an option. 62
Furthermore, as in Furman, the Court in Gregg was concerned with
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the sentence of death. The Godfrey
Court explained:
In Furman v. Georgia ... the Court held that the penalty of death
may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a substantial
risk that the punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. Gregg v. Georgia, supra, reaffirmed this holding ....
This means that if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it
has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner
that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.
163
The Kentucky legislature has authorized the means of administering capital
punishment by its specific language in Kentucky Revised Statutes section
532.025. The legislature has tailored section 532.025(3) to give the jury a
standard for sentencing deliberations to prevent "arbitrary" or "capricious"
application of capital punishment. The Kentucky Supreme Court's
interpretation of section 532.025 in Harris may jeopardize the statute's
constitutionality.
VI. ANALYSIS
The Harris decision presents these issues: whether it reflects a correct
application of Kentucky Revised Statutes section 532.025 and, if not, what
effect this decision has on Kentucky law. As previously discussed, there is
161 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192-93 (1976).
'62 See K.R.S. § 532.025(3).
163 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1980).
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substantial evidence that the Kentucky Supreme Court decided this case
incorrectly. Other than due process and stare decisis concerns, the
importance of analyzing Harris is the impact this decision has on the
development of Kentucky law.164
While it may seem reasonable to receive a sentence of life without
possibility of parole for twenty-five years for the crime of kidnapping
where a murder is committed in the course of the kidnapping, the Kentucky
legislature has not so provided. A court cannot violate the doctrine of
separation of powers to compensate for the silence of a legislature.
Although the Harris court acknowledged that section 532.025(3) requires
a finding of an aggravating circumstance in section 532.025(2), the court
nevertheless decided to rely on the introductory language of section
532.025(2) as authority for the jury to recommend a capital sentence. 6 '
That introductory language allows the jury to consider any other circum-
stance "otherwise authorized by law."' 6
When the court misapplied this introductory language, a violation of
the separation of powers doctrine occurred. By applying this introductory
language to fit the outcome of this case, the court, in essence, created a new
statutory aggravating circumstance, which may be unconstitutional.
Further, it ignored the fact that the legislature drafted the law to include
specific enumerated aggravating circumstances.
Although section 532.025(2), as enacted by the legislature, arguably
satisfies the "specificity" requirement of the Godfrey case,167 the court's
interpretation of the statute may render it subject to constitutional
challenge. By relying on the use of the introductory language of section
532.025(2) to allow the jury to consider any aggravating circumstance
"otherwise authorized by law," and thus permitting the imposition of a
capital sentence, 168 the court in Harris may have rendered the statutory
language vague. "Authorized by law" could represent several meanings.
One interpretation of this phrase would limit "authorized by law" to those
circumstances enumerated in section 532.025(2) of the statute. A broader
'64 See generally FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 158, at
78 (recommending that "a Sentencing Commission should be created to conduct
a comprehensive review of sentencing in Kentucky and make recommendations
regarding reform of the current structure").
'
6s See Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Ky. 1990).
66K.R.S. § 532.025(2).
167 See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (requiring "specific and detailed" guidance)
(citing Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976)).
168 See Harris, 793 S.W.2d at 805.
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and more vague interpretation could include virtually any other circum-
stance which a judge would deem appropriate to the facts.
Moreover, if the intent of the legislature was to include a "catch-all"
aggravating circumstance outside of those enumerated, the legislature could
have included an eighth circumstance which indicated, "or any other
circumstance."Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 169 Since the legislature
specifically included seven circumstances under section 532.025(2), i7 ° the
legislature's silence as to an eighth "catch-all" circumstance should not be
overlooked. If the legislature intended a "catch-all," it seems the appropri-
ate place to list one would be after the enumerated circumstances.1
7'
What then is the purpose for consideration ofnonstatutory aggravating
circumstances? One purpose for considering a nonstatutory circumstance
could be to supplement the total circumstances the jury may consider. The
jury must consider any of the statutory aggravating circumstances
enumerated and any other circumstance authorized by law. 72 However,
section 532.025(3) indicates that there still must be ajury finding of at least
one of the enumerated circumstances in order to apply a death sentence or
a sentence of life without possibility of parole for twenty-five years. 73
Another role of the nonstatutory circumstance could be to aid the jury when
considering all of the circumstances, but a nonstatutory circumstance could
not be used to apply the death sentence or life without possibility of parole
for twenty-five years.
If the purpose of the nonstatutory circumstance is to supplement
consideration of the statutory circumstances, then what effect does Harris
have on Kentucky law? As mentioned above, there is a stare decisis
concern. Harris is still good law in Kentucky courts. On July 1, 1997,
Kentucky executed Harold McQueen by electric chair, which was the first
69 "A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
170 See K.R.S. § 532.025(2)(a).
171 See FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 158, at 76-77
(recommending that the circumstances listed in section 532.025 be expanded to
include the following aggravating circumstances: (1) The murder of a witness in
a civil or criminal proceeding; (2) the murder of a child under the age of twelve;
and (3) a murder which is premeditated or planned). See generally Jack Brammer,
LongerJail Tenns Recommendedfor Violent Crimes, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER
(Lexington, Ky.), Nov. 21, 1997, at Al.
'
7 1 See K.R.S. § 532.025(2).
" See id. § 532.025(3).
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execution in Kentucky in thirty-five years. 74 If Harris is still good law,
then Kentucky judges are confronted with the absence of a clear standard
for what can be considered a valid aggravating circumstance under section
532.025(3) during the sentencing phase of a capital trial." No longer must
a judge or jury, in compliance with the specific language of section
532.025(3), find a statutory aggravating circumstance as listed in section
532.025(2). If ajudge permits the introduction of a circumstance different
than those listed, but "authorized by law," then according to Harris, the
jury could sentence the defendant to death having found only that
additional circumstance's existence. Future "arbitrary" and "capricious"
administration of the death penalty becomes a current concern in light of
the Harris court's interpretation of section 532.025.176
Finally, another effect of this interpretation of section 532.025 is the
potential for prosecutors to misuse it as a tool for plea bargaining. Where
a defendant is charged with murder or kidnapping, but sufficient evidence
that any of the circumstances as listed in subsection two is lacking, the
prosecutor could use the Harris decision to encourage the defendant to plea
to a lesser sentence. Relying on the vague language of "authorized by
law," '77 the prosecutor could seek a plea bargain with the defendant by
raising the prospect that the defendant could receive the death penalty or
life without possibility of parole for twenty-five years. 78 Thus, the
defendant could suffer from potential "scare tactics." Ultimately, Harris
could jeopardize the integrity of Kentucky's entire judicial system. '
74 See James Malone, The Death Penalty in Kentucky; Executioner, Protesters
Set for Inmate's Last Day, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), June 30, 1997, at
Al; Michael Quinlan, Courts Refuse to Delay Execution, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), July 1, 1997, at A6.
"s See FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 158, at 81 ("The
framework and many of the sentencing provisions of the Code are incompatible
with each other and with the sentencing philosophy being pursued by decision and
policy makers. The whole system needs to be reviewed, rethought, and restructured
176 See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (discussing "arbi-
trary" and "capricious"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (discussing "arbi-
trary" and "capricious").
177 See K.R.S. § 532.025(2).
178 See generally Joseph Gerth, Kentucky Execution Reopens Life-Without-
Parole Debate: McQueen s Death Could Influence Bill in Legislature, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 13, 1997, at Al.
[VOL. 87
HARRIS V. COMMONWEALTH
VII. CONCLUSION
Harris is not a current case. However, the importance of studying this
decision is evident in light of its impact on Kentucky's legal system. While
this case is over eight years old, it is still the law in Kentucky and serves
as an important precedent for judges in sentencing. The Supreme Court of
Kentucky should revisit its holding in Harris that interprets the introduc-
tory language of Kentucky Revised Statutes section 532.025(2) to allow a
judge or jury to find an aggravating circumstance outside of those listed in
section 532.025(2)(a). 17 9 Furthermore, the Kentucky General Assembly
should clarify this language to eliminate any inconsistency in the statute's
interpretation and application. Should the General Assembly decide to
revise the Kentucky Penal Code, it is important to consider the inconsis-
tency with which the court has interpreted section 532.025. The Kentucky
legislature should also consider the principles set forth in Gregg and draft
a new section which is clear on its face in its interpretation and application
to avoid a future constitutional challenge that the law is "arbitrary,"
"capricious," or vague.
79 See Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Ky. 1990).
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